A very British NGSW: Thoughts on the next generation of service rifles
The newly-adopted XM5 Battle Rifle (SIG Sauer MCX SPEAR)
Earlier this year the US defense establishment answered a crucial question; What will replace the aging M4 platform as the next-generation service rifle of the US Army? The answer is the highly anticipated XM5, a variant of SIG Sauer MCX SPEAR assault rifle chambered in the new proprietary .277 Fury caliber cartridge.
The adoption of the XM5 was a result of the US Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program. The program invited private industry to develop and present trial rifles designed to overcome the perceived limitations of the current issue M4 variants, based on lessons learned about the weapon’s combat effectiveness in the wars in Afghanistan and the new threat posed by conflict with near-peer nations:
Limited range and poor ballistic characteristics - US and ISAF forces were consistently outranged by Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, often using ancient soviet AKM’s and PKM’s chambered in longer range 7.62mm calibers.
Limited ability to defeat modern combat body armour, which is now being issued to the frontline combat units of near-peer nations like China and Russia.
US ‘overmatch’ charts showing the range capability gap.
It’s the cartridge, stupid!
5.56x45mm NATO rifle ammunition
The limitations identified with the M4 family are less to do with the rifle itself, which is on the whole beloved by its operators and has proven a highly modular and mature weapon system. It certainly has aged more gracefully than many of its contemporaries (The UK’s L85, Germany’s HKG36, or France’s FAMAS to name a few).
The limitations of the M4 are in fact due to the bullet it fires. The ubiquitous 5.56x45mm NATO. The 5.56 has been the predominant service rifle cartridge in use by most NATO member states since the 1970s.
The 5.56 was designed in the 1950s by Fairchild Industries, an element of Remington, as a lightweight intermediate round inspired by testing being carried out by FN and the British MoD to create an ideal intermediate rifle caliber. Being considerably lighter and less powerful than the newly standardised 7.62x51mm NATO battle rifle cartridge, the round’s low-recoil enabled more accurate fully automatic fire and its light weight meant users could carry more ammunition, thus achieving higher volumes of fire.
Research by US military planners in the late 1950s concluded that most decisive combat action took place at relatively close ranges, around 200-300 yards. Therefore a smaller caliber round that could be fired accurately at high rates of fire was thought to be more lethal, better at winning firefights, and therefore superior to larger caliber predecessor cartridges.
This thinking was put to the test during the Vietnam war. US troops equipped with the then cutting-edge M16A1 chambered in 5.56 utilised the volume of fire it afforded to good effect against the poorly equipped and irregular forces of the Viet Cong and NVA.
Vindcita for the boffins surely?
Though it’s worth noting that even during the Vietnam war, US Army officials did recognise issues with the performance of the 5.56, specifically its lack of stopping power and the tendency of the lighter bullets to ricochet when fired through the dense jungle foliage of southeast Asia.
A bigger bullet.
SIG Fury .277 calibre ammunition
The adoption of the XM5 and .277 Fury cartridge should certainly address the two main limitations of the 5.56, namely its relatively poor range and inability to defeat near-peer combat body armour. The .277 Fury is a much more powerful cartridge, operating at chamber pressures in excess of 80,000 psi and launching a 135-grain steel core bullet at nearly 3,000 ft/s.
The new round is designed to reach out accurately beyond 1,000 yards, double the effective range of the 5.56, and once it hits a target be able to do so with enough energy to penetrate class 4 hard body armor plates (approximately 5A/6 in Russian). In theory, the XM5 will allow the US infantryman to reach out further, more accurately, and with more lethality than the rest of the NATO roster still wedded to the 5.56x45mm.
Clearly, US Army planners think future wars will be fought at longer ranges against near-peer foes wearing modern ballistic protection. It’s a gamble on the future, albeit one that is seemingly looking prophetic following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the XM5 and the spicy hot .277 Fury cartridge may have some potential drawbacks.
Hotter means heavier!
SIG MCX SPEAR with accessories
The XM5 weapon system itself is considerably heavier than the rifle it’s replacing, about 2.8 kgs more than an equivalent Block 2 M4 variant with ammunition. The heavy and expensive higher caliber ammunition means fewer rounds being fired down range, flying in the face of the current US small unit doctrine which is all about weight of fire and establishing fire superiority when coming into contact with the enemy.
The ergonomics of the XM5 are designed to be as similar to the M4/AR15 family as possible, to reduce training burdens and probably to help cautious decision-makers in the US Army feel more comfortable with SIG’s NGSW submission. All the modern AR-15 platform design elements are there. Ambidextrous fire selectors, the pistol grip, a winged rear-pull charging handle, and a forward assist. So similar to the M4 the manual of arms probably won’t need updating much.
However, the longer barrel length, heavier weight, and chunkier overall profile of the XM5 may make for potentially awkward handling when engaging at FIBUA and CQB ranges. There is also the cost factor to consider. The extremely high cost associated with the procurement of a brand-new rifle and associated maintenance, training, new ammunition, and expanded logistics is considerable. The USA has the largest defence budget in the world by a country mile and has as yet only secured medium-term procurement contracts for the XM5, which will only be equipped to frontline combat troops in the near future.
A very British NGSW: similarities to the .280 British
British soldiers trialing the EM2 experimental battle rifle chambered in .280 British
On this side of the pond, the adoption of the XM5 has clear implications for British defence planners and the inevitable replacement of the L85 series of service rifles. The same issues identified by the Americans with the M4 certainly apply to the L85A3 currently in use by the British Army. It fires the same underpowered round from a platform that has earned itself a poor reputation as a reliable service rifle.
The question arises, should the MoD launch its own NGSW program, and if so, should we follow the American lead in developing a bigger and more powerful service rifle cartridge?
Interestingly, if we look back at the history of intermediate service rifle cartridges there is a curious similarity between the .277 Fury the US has just adopted, and a much older British cartridge tested in the 1950s. The .280 British.
In the aftermath of World War II, the British Army began experimenting with lighter rounds after meeting the German StG-44 in combat. The Army began the development of a new intermediate cartridge based on the German 7.92mm ‘Kurz’. Dubbed the .280 British, it was trialed at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in 1954 on the experimental EM2 trial rifle.
Despite its success as an intermediate cartridge, touting superior ballistics and low recoil relative to its competitors, the .280 British was not considered powerful enough by the U.S. Army (Yes, really), who ultimately adopted the 7.62×51mm NATO cartridge. The US went on to drop the 7.62x51mm in favour of the 5.56x45mm, only to develop the aforementioned .277 Fury to replace the underpowered 5.56 some sixty years later.
History doesn’t repeat, but it does rhyme.
Replacing the L85A3: lessons from the NGSW.
L85A3, the UK’s current issue service rifle
It’s inevitable that over the next ten years, British defence planners will need to procure a future-proof replacement for the L85A3. Given the recent history of MoD procurement woes, that might be easier said than done. But putting the scathing irony to one side, here are the three things I think a suitable replacement for the L85A3 must achieve:
Win the next war, not the last one: Defence planners can be similar to failed political candidates, they try to fight the last election better rather than focus on the one at hand. Future threats to Britain likely include fighting near-peer adversaries, so more powerful cartridges capable of defeating body armour make sense. That said, insurgencies aren’t going anywhere (see West Africa) so something durable and reliable will likely trump something fancy and prone to breaking.
Keep it simple (and cheap): Similar to the point above about reliable trumping fancy, but also taking into account cost. Military equipment is expensive, but making poor choices at the tendering stage (see SA80A1) can turn expensive into prohibitive. Simplicity in production, usage, and maintenance is crucial. The MoD can only dream of DoD budgets, so this one is a must.
Probably be made in the UK: It’s difficult to argue in favour of the British Defence Industry (See Ajax IFV) but when it comes to a service rifle it really should be made here. HK, SIG Sauer, LMT, Colt Canada (formerly Diemaco) - all fantastic small arms companies making truly world-beating products, but if Britain does go to war it would be silly if the most essential piece of kit a soldier needs, a rifle, is stuck in customs.
Speaking of posturing on new British Army small arms procurement, my colleague has written a thorough deep dive into the tender put out by the newly formed Ranger regiment for a new service rifle.
